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THE COST OF SUING BUSINESS
Joanna C. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION
To listen to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, one would think that
class actions are the most significant scourge on business ever con-
jured up by man.  In brief after brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Chamber of Commerce and other business amici tell the same story:
Meritless class actions, filed by rapacious plaintiffs’ attorneys for the
ostensible benefit of consumers, employees, and shareholders, are so
devastatingly expensive to defend against, and threaten such financial
devastation if plaintiffs prevail, that corporate defendants cannot help
but accept “blackmail settlements” that harm both businesses’ bottom
lines and society at large.1
The Supreme Court appears to have premised several recent civil
procedure decisions on this depiction of the costs and burdens of class
action litigation.  The Court invoked this narrative in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly2 as justification for the plausibility pleading stan-
dard.3  The Court also invoked this narrative when, in AT&T Mobility
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Thanks also to Thomas Cochrane, Braden Holly, Tommy Huynh, Elyse Meyers, and the expert
research staff at UCLA’s Hugh & Hazel Darling Law Library for excellent research assistance.
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Stephan Landsman for inviting me to participate in the 21st Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort
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lege of Law, and thanks to Robert Clifford for establishing and supporting such a wonderful
event.
1. Although this Article focuses on arguments against class actions, this same rhetoric has
been used to critique all types of lawsuits brought by individuals against corporations. See, e.g.,
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation as a Measure of Well-Being, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 247 (2013)
(“[P]ortraying much litigation as pathological is a key component of business lobbying groups’
social construction of the legal system.  These groups commission and use questionable social
science analysis and misleadingly portray highly publicized cases, such as the McDonald’s coffee-
spill case.  They do so to help characterize civil litigation as dominated by lottery-seeking plain-
tiffs, greedy plaintiffs’ lawyers, and state civil justice systems that are overly hostile to business.”
(footnotes omitted)).
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3. See infra notes 23–26 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s plausibility R
requirement in pleading).
655
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LLC v. Concepcion,4 it allowed class action waivers in consumer arbi-
tration agreements.5  In other decisions—including Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes6 and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,7 two recent opinions
interpreting class certification requirements—the Court did not ex-
plicitly invoke this narrative but adopted, in significant measure, the
positions advocated by the Chamber of Commerce and other business
amici, leaving one with the impression that the Justices in the majority
found the amici’s depictions of the dangers of class actions to be
compelling.8
These arguments do not appear in all class action cases.  Instead,
they seem to be reserved for what Professor Marc Galanter refers to
as “uphill” cases: cases brought by individuals—employees, consum-
ers, and shareholders—against corporations.9  When the Supreme
Court heard American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,10 in
which a class of small business owners sued American Express for the
fees it charged, the Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief in
support of American Express that raised none of these arguments.11
The Court’s decision was similarly bereft of any criticism of the merits
of the case or the motives of class counsel, and it did not mention the
danger of a blackmail settlement.  These criticisms of class action liti-
gation appear specifically targeted to class actions brought by groups
of individuals against corporations.
In this Article, I examine the empirical support for five interrelated
claims about the deleterious effects of uphill class actions: (1) class
actions force blackmail settlements; (2) class actions impose cata-
strophic costs on corporate defendants; (3) class actions are usually
meritless; (4) plaintiffs’ class action attorneys are usually unscrupu-
lous; and (5) the costs of class actions harm society at large.  There is
very little reliable empirical information available about any aspect of
modern civil litigation, including class actions.12  But little more than
4. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
5. See infra notes 33–38 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s restrictions on class R
arbitration).
6. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
7. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
8. See also infra notes 27–32 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s restrictions on R
class action certification).
9. Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want To
Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577, 593.
10. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
11. See Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (No. 12-133), 2012 WL 3766956.
12. In 1993, Marc Galanter observed that “[t]he most basic data about our civil justice system
are not collected systematically and cumulatively.”  Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The
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anecdote supports these claims, and at least some available evidence
undermines these five assertions about the costs and burdens of class
action suits.13  I describe assertions about the costs and burdens of
class actions in Part II and then consider each of these claims in turn.14
In Part III, I describe evidence suggesting that corporate defendants
do not systematically accept blackmail settlements in class actions.15
One would expect that if defendants were accepting blackmail settle-
ments, they would do so immediately after certification to avoid the
costs of discovery.  Instead, it appears that defendants generally do
not settle soon after certification and often proceed through discov-
ery.  Moreover, settlement and trial rates in class actions are compara-
ble to rates in non-class action cases, suggesting that class actions, on
the whole, are no more coercive to defendants than any other kind of
litigation.
In Part IV, I contend that available evidence undermines assertions
that class actions impose debilitating costs on corporate defendants.16
Although businesses spend a great deal of money on class actions,
they appear to spend even more money suing each other.  Businesses
sue other businesses far more often than classes of plaintiffs sue busi-
nesses, and available evidence indicates that non-class, intra-business
disputes may be as expensive or, perhaps, more expensive to defend
against. One may believe that all litigation is too expensive.  But if
class actions are no more financially devastating to businesses than
non-class, intra-business disputes, there is no basis to single out class
actions as particularly deserving of limitation.
In Part V, I consider assertions that class action claims are regularly
meritless and plaintiffs’ attorneys regularly place their own interests
above those of their clients.17  Although there are examples of these
types of claims and attorneys, there is no reason to believe that class
Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 99 (1993).  Twenty years later, Arthur
Miller had the same complaint. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in
Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 286, 361–63 (2013) (describing the unavailability of information about the frequency
with which meritless lawsuits are filed, the frequency of abusive litigation tactics, the frequency
of extortionate settlements, and the “economic aspects and behavioral implications of
litigation”).
13. This Article does not present original research—instead, it employs what Marc Galanter
has called a “bricolage strategy” in that it tries to “capture, refine, and juxtapose scattered data
already in the public domain, extracting a focused account from bodies of information gathered
for other purposes.”  Galanter, supra note 9, at 577. R
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
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actions are more often frivolous than other types of cases or that
plaintiffs’ attorneys who bring class actions are any more unscrupu-
lous than other members of the bar.  The very businesses that com-
plain about meritless class actions sometimes bring questionable
claims against their competitors.18  And just as plaintiffs’ class action
attorneys have been criticized for focusing overmuch on lining their
own pockets, attorneys who represent corporations have been criti-
cized for valuing their fees above their clients’ best interests.
In Part VI, I contend that business amici and the U.S. Supreme
Court underestimate the costs of restricting plaintiffs’ access to the
courts.19  Closing the courthouse doors limits plaintiffs’ abilities to
seek redress, prevents public disclosure of information about defend-
ants’ misconduct, and even inhibits defendants’ abilities to learn about
their own behavior from the lawsuits brought against them.  Business
amici and the Court should, but do not, take account of the individual
and societal harms associated with limiting redress for plaintiffs.
For each of these reasons, prevailing depictions of the costs and
burdens of class actions appear to be both unfounded and incomplete.
I do not, however, mean to suggest that the current state of class ac-
tion litigation could not be improved.  The asymmetries of class ac-
tions give both defendants and plaintiffs much to complain about.20  I
also do not offer my own calculations of the precise costs of class ac-
tions, the relative costs of class actions and non-class, intra-business
disputes, or the value to plaintiffs and society at large of suits that
could be barred by recent procedural decisions.  These calculations
would be impossible because available data on these and many other
aspects of modern civil litigation are woefully inadequate.
Instead, I intend to caution the Court against relying on anecdote,
exaggeration, and fabrication when interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.  The Court should not heed advocates’ and amici’s
assertions about the effects of class actions and other procedural fea-
tures when no empirical evidence is available to support those asser-
tions.  Instead, the Court should defer the assessment of these claims
to other entities—including Congress and the Judicial Conference—
that are better situated to examine the effects of these rules on liti-
gants and adjust procedural rules accordingly.  In the alternative, the
Court should place more faith in nondispositive procedural tools—
18. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (describing suits by Intel Corp.). R
19. See infra Part VI.
20. See infra notes 90–92, for some of these complaints. R
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what I have called “pathway” rules21—to address concerns about ex-
cessive cost, delay, and unjust outcomes without unduly prejudicing
plaintiffs.  The Court has, in fact, followed both of these approaches in
recent decisions.22  Perhaps closer scrutiny of available evidence re-
garding the costs of suing business—and fuller acknowledgement of
the limits of our knowledge about these costs—would encourage simi-
lar decisions in years to come.
II. THE CASES
The U.S. Supreme Court has justified restrictions on pleading, class
action certification, and class arbitrations as a means of protecting
business defendants from the costs and burdens of being sued.  In
both the Court’s decisions and in the briefs submitted to the Court by
the Chamber of Commerce and other interested parties, class actions
are repeatedly characterized as frivolous, filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys
seeking to line their own pockets rather than help their clients, and so
devastatingly expensive to defend against that defendants are forced
to accept blackmail settlements that harm businesses’ bottom lines
and society at large.
A. Pleading
The Supreme Court’s requirement that plaintiffs plead “plausible”
claims before being allowed to proceed to discovery, first announced
by the Court in Twombly, was prompted by concerns about the costs
and burdens of uphill class actions.  In their joint amicus brief to the
Court, the Chamber of Commerce and other businesses and business
associations argued that pleadings in “lawyer-driven class actions, like
this case” should be carefully scrutinized “[b]ecause of the risk that
massive class actions will be filed solely to pressure defendants to set-
tle rather than endure enormous discovery costs, even though the
claims have no merit.”23
It is no accident that the pleading question presented here arises
in the context of a putative class action brought by a law firm that is
part of the organized plaintiffs’ class-action bar. . . .
The impetus for cases like this one is not actual suspicion of
wrongdoing, and certainly not the expectation that an actual trial on
21. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure, 60 UCLA L. REV.
1652 (2013), for a description of pathway rules and the differences between pathway and gate-
way rules as I have defined them.
22. See infra Part VII for a discussion of these alternatives and recent examples from the
Court.
23. Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 7, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 901172.
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the merits will yield success, but the hope that the thinnest of allega-
tions, with the greatest of legal consequences, will survive motions
to dismiss and begin to put pressure on defendants to settle complex
litigation.  Judge Friendly – borrowing a term used earlier by anti-
trust scholar Milton Handler – termed this the “blackmail
settlement.”24
Briefs filed by the American Bar Association and the United States
echoed these arguments,25 and the Court then adopted these argu-
ments in its opinion.  Writing for the majority, Justice Souter justified
the need for plausibility pleading on the grounds that antitrust discov-
ery is expensive and “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-
conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching
[summary judgment].”26
B. Class Action Certification
The Chamber of Commerce and others have made similar argu-
ments in favor of stricter class action certification requirements.  In its
amicus brief in Wal-Mart, the Chamber of Commerce argued that al-
lowing certification of the class of current and former employees
would
dramatically expand the exposure of American businesses to poten-
tially bankrupting class actions . . . .  Such a result would erase de-
cades of class-action precedents protecting defendants from unfair
trials – and would bury American businesses in abusive class-action
lawsuits to the detriment of consumers, the U.S. economy and the
judicial system itself.27
Similar arguments were made in amicus briefs filed by Intel Corp., the
Association of Global Automakers Inc., and DRI—The Voice of the
Defense Bar.28
24. Id. at 21–22 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)).
25. Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Petitioners nor Re-
spondents, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 2006 WL 2503551; Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Petitioners, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 2006 WL 2482696.
26. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59.
27. Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–5,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 288900.
28. See Brief of the Ass’n of Glob. Automakers, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner at 13, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 288899 (“Broadening the scope of
Rule 23(b)(2) to permit certification of monetary claims that also seek injunctive relief could
have disastrous consequences for the automobile industry by unduly magnifying the risks attend-
ing substantive claims that present individualized inquiries or have questionable merit.”); Brief
of DRI—The Voice of the Def. Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20, Wal-Mart,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 288903 (“The inevitable result [of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s class certification standard] is to intensify the pressure that a
class certification order puts on a defendant to settle, making the class action procedure even
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The Chamber of Commerce and other business amici raised these
same concerns again in their amicus brief in Comcast.  Although the
Court decided the case on other grounds, it granted certiorari in Com-
cast on the question of whether Daubert’s requirements for expert tes-
timony applied to the class certification stage.29  In their joint amicus
brief, the Chamber of Commerce and other business associations pre-
dicted that not requiring experts’ testimony to satisfy Daubert at the
certification stage would “lower[ ] the bar for class certification” and
thereby “raise the cost of doing business in the wide variety of indus-
tries that find themselves perennial targets of the plaintiffs’ bar.”30
The brief emphasized that these increased costs arise from largely
meritless cases that force costly settlements: “Because of litigation
costs and damages exposure, a defendant will only rarely choose to
litigate a class action past the threshold stage, even if the underlying
claims are meritless.  Accordingly, billions of dollars are spent settling
class actions every year.”31  The amici argued that “[t]he costs of abu-
sive class actions” not only impact businesses but also “impose a drag
on the American economy and are ultimately passed on to consumers,
employees, and shareholders.”32
Although the Supreme Court’s majority opinions in Wal-Mart and
Comcast do not explicitly adopt the business amici’s reasoning on
these points, both opinions adopt the restrictions they encouraged.
C. Class Arbitration
The Chamber of Commerce and other business amici describe the
dangers of aggregation in arbitration in similar terms.  In its brief in
support of AT&T in Concepcion, the Chamber of Commerce argued
that businesses must be able to restrict aggregation of claims because
[w]hether the forum is arbitral or judicial, once a class is certified an
action that individually might be worth only a few hundred dollars
or less can instantly metastasize into a potentially catastrophic judg-
more attractive for plaintiffs pursuing frivolous claims.”); Brief of Intel Corp. as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 5, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 288897 (“Even a
properly certified class action imposes significant—and potentially catastrophic—costs on de-
fendants.  Resting thousands or even millions of claims upon a single liability determination
transforms ordinary lawsuits into true bet-the-company litigation.”).
29. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(describing the differences between the question posed by Comcast for review and the question
certified by the Court for review).
30. Brief for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
4, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (No. 11-864), 2012 WL 3643755.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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ment of hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars of damages.
Defendants will almost inevitably settle in those circumstances.33
The Chamber of Commerce contended that defendants would be
forced to settle meritless cases.
Basic mathematics and risk aversion make it so: Attorneys’ fees
aside, a risk-averse defendant that thinks it has a 90 percent chance
of defeating a $100 million class action is still better off settling for
$9.9 million.  The result is an in terrorem effect that compels defend-
ants to settle claims that have no merit.34
According to the Chamber of Commerce, plaintiffs and their attor-
neys use these dynamics to their best advantage: “So long as defend-
ants are likely to settle litigation or arbitration whenever a class is
certified, plaintiffs’ lawyers have an incentive to seek such certifica-
tion, even if their clients deserve no compensation.”35
Once again, the Supreme Court accepted as true the concerns
raised by the Chamber of Commerce about the dangers of aggrega-
tion in arbitration.  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia observed
that class arbitration “greatly increases risks to defendants,” including
the risk that “errors will go uncorrected.”36  Such a risk becomes “un-
acceptable,” according to the majority, when “damages allegedly
owed to tens of thousands of potential claimants are aggregated and
decided at once . . . .  [D]efendants will be pressured into settling
questionable claims.  Other courts have noted the risk of ‘in terrorem’
settlements that class actions entail, and class arbitration would be no
different.”37
The Court’s majority opinions in each of these cases appear to con-
clude that strengthening what I have called procedural “gateways”38—
in the form of rigorous pleading and class certification requirements
as well as enforcement of arbitration agreements that prohibit aggre-
gate adjudication—is necessary to protect businesses from the finan-
cial risks and burdens of aggregation.
III. THE FREQUENCY OF BLACKMAIL SETTLEMENTS
The Supreme Court has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to get
past litigation gateways and has upheld class action waivers in arbitra-
tion agreements in partial reliance on the notion that the costs of dis-
33. Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7,
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3167313.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id. at 9.
36. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350.
37. Id. (citation omitted).
38. See Schwartz, supra note 21. R
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covery and threatened costs of any judgment force corporate
defendants to settle meritless class actions.  Commentators have de-
spaired of blackmail settlements since the Rule 23(b)(3) class was cre-
ated.39  Yet, despite its pervasiveness, there appears to be no hard
evidence to support the claim.40  In Parts IV and V, I consider the
evidentiary support for assertions that class actions are especially
costly and especially likely to involve meritless claims.41 In this Part, I
consider the extent to which class action defendants’ settlement be-
havior suggests that they are being forced to settle meritless claims to
avoid the costs of litigation and judgment.  The limited evidence avail-
able in this area calls into question the blackmail settlement hypothe-
sis in three respects.
First, courts regularly dismiss class action claims they find to be
meritless.  The Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) 1996 study of class ac-
tion litigation in four federal districts found that “two out of three
cases in each of the four districts had rulings on either a motion to
dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, or a sua sponte dismissal
order[,]” “three of ten cases in each district were terminated as the
direct result of a ruling on a motion to dismiss or for summary judg-
ment,” and approximately one-half of the cases “included rulings dis-
missing all or part of the complaint.”42  A more recent FJC study of
231 diversity class actions filed in federal court reached similar find-
ings: district courts dismissed 29% of cases not remanded to state
court.43  Another recent study of securities class actions also reached
similar findings.44  In other words, in close to one-third of class actions
39. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang,
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 599 n.50 (2013).
40. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Ac-
tions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2000) (“[T]he risks of . . .
blackmail settlements have been overstated.”); Warren F. Schwartz, Long-Shot Class Actions:
Toward a Normative Theory of Legal Uncertainty, 8 LEGAL THEORY 297, 298 (2002) (arguing
that the threat of blackmail settlements is “unsupported on any basis currently articulated in
judicial opinions or legal scholarship”); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certifica-
tion and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1357 (2003) (observing that “the charge that class
actions subject defendants to excessive settlement pressure” relies on “factual assertions that are
questionable or unproven”).
41. See infra Parts IV and V.
42. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS
IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES 8, 33 (1996).
43. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE
TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 6 tbl.6 (2008).
44. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 48 tbl.1 (2009) (reporting that 30.6% of securities class actions
studied were dismissed pretrial after the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
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filed, “judicial rulings on motions terminated the litigation without a
settlement, coerced or otherwise.”45
Second, when courts grant class certification and deny motions to
dismiss in class actions, defendants do not immediately settle to avoid
discovery and trial (as one would expect if fears of blackmail settle-
ments were well founded).  In their amicus brief in Comcast, the
Chamber of Commerce and other business associations claimed that
“[b]ecause of litigation costs and damages exposure, a defendant will
only rarely choose to litigate a class action past the threshold stage,
even if the underlying claims are meritless.”46  Yet, the FJC’s 1996
study found that the majority of certified class actions proceeded
through discovery to summary judgment.47  And, when cases did set-
tle, the FJC found that the timing of those settlements “did not sup-
port any inference of a relationship between certification and
settlement.”48  The FJC researchers found no evidence that “the certi-
fication decision itself, as opposed to the merits of the underlying
claims, coerced settlements with any frequency.”49
Third, despite the belief that class actions impose unique burdens
on defendants that cause them to settle, studies have found that both
class and non-class action cases usually settle.50  And class actions, like
non-class action cases, very rarely go to trial.51  Settlement and trial
rates for class actions and non-class action cases are not precisely the
(PSLRA) and that 21.4% of class actions filed in the pre-PSLRA period were dismissed
pretrial).
45. WILLGING ET AL., supra note 42, at 34. R
46. Brief for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al., supra note 30, at 4. R
47. WILLGING ET AL., supra note 42, at 33. R
48. Id. at 62.
49. Id. at 61.
50. See STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES:
CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992, at 2 (1995) (finding that 73% of state tort cases
settle); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should
We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 (2009) (finding that 66.9% of all civil claims settle);
Silver, supra note 40, at 1399 (observing that the FJC study found that certified class actions in R
four federal districts settled an average of 73% of the time); id. at 1399 n.178 (citing other studies
that found 78% settlement rates for class actions).
51. Compare WILLGING ET AL., supra note 42, at 179 tbl.39 (reporting that the class action R
trial rate was 8% in one district, 6% in another district, and 0% in two districts), and James Bohn
& Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Ac-
tions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 930–31 (1996) (finding that 3% of securities class actions studied
went to trial), and Choi et al., supra note 44, at 48 tbl.1 (finding that 3.1% of class actions filed R
between 1996–2000, before the PSLRA went into effect, went to trial—with all resulting in de-
fense verdicts—and finding no class action trials post-PSLRA), with Marc Galanter, The Vanish-
ing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004) (finding that 1.8% of federal civil cases went to trial in
2002), and Silver, supra note 40, at 1401–02 (citing studies that found similar trial rates in non- R
class cases).
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same52 and appear to be shifting over time.53  But as Professor Charles
Silver concluded after looking at this evidence: “When compared to
conventional lawsuits, class actions do not seem exceptionally
coercive.”54
The Chamber of Commerce and fellow business amici have repeat-
edly claimed that businesses are regularly forced to accept blackmail
settlements in meritless cases to avoid the debilitating costs of discov-
ery and the possibility of gargantuan judgments.  Yet available evi-
dence indicates that courts regularly dismiss class actions they find to
be without merit, most class actions that are certified do not settle
before discovery, the timing of settlements does not suggest that they
are coerced by certification decisions, and class actions are settled and
tried with approximately the same frequency as cases that are not
class actions.  This evidence undermines assumptions regarding black-
mail settlements underlying the Supreme Court’s recent decisions to
make pleading and class certification more onerous and to allow busi-
nesses to restrict aggregation through their arbitration agreements.
IV. THE COSTS OF CLASS ACTIONS
In briefs advocating for procedural restrictions on class actions, bus-
iness amici assert that class actions impose massive, catastrophic, and
potentially bankrupting financial burdens on corporate defendants.55
But we do not actually know how much businesses spend on class ac-
tion litigation.  Professor Brian Fitzpatrick found that in 2006 and
2007, businesses paid plaintiffs and their attorneys a total of $33 bil-
lion to resolve class actions pending in federal court.56  This figure
does not include the amounts paid to plaintiffs and their attorneys in
state court cases or the fees businesses paid their own counsel, so the
52. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 126 n.52 (2000), for a survey of available evidence about class action and
non-class action settlement and trial rates and the difficulties of comparing existing evidence
about the two.  Different types of class actions also have different trial rates.  Although securities
class actions appear to go to trial 3% of the time, a FJC study of 231 class actions alleging
violations of state law found that none of the cases went to trial. LEE & WILLGING, supra note
43, at 6; see also supra note 51, and accompanying text. R
53. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1955
(2009); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1255, 1256 fig.1, 1257 fig.2, 1257–59 (2005); and Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood
Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 633, for evidence of declining
trial rates.
54. Silver, supra note 40, at 1402. R
55. See supra notes 23, 27, 33, and accompanying text. R
56. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 826, 845 (2010).
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total spent by businesses in class action litigation during those two
years was likely significantly higher.
How “massive” and “catastrophic” to corporate America is the $33
billion spent in federal court class actions over a two-year period?  It
certainly sounds like a lot of money.  Based on these figures, Fitzpat-
rick estimates that “federal class action settlements involve the same
amount of wealth as 10 percent of the entire U.S. tort system.”57  On
the other hand, the federal class action settlement amounts reported
by Fitzpatrick amount to less than .2% of the $20.5 trillion in revenues
earned by Fortune 500 companies during the same period.58  Viewed
from this perspective, class action costs seem more modest.
In this Part, I offer another metric by which to assess claims that
class action litigation costs are “massive,” “catastrophic,” and “poten-
tially bankrupting”—the other litigation costs borne by corporations.
Available evidence offers three related reasons to believe that corpo-
rations likely spend as much—or more—money suing each other than
they do on class actions: (1) businesses sue each other far more often
than classes of plaintiffs sue businesses; (2) businesses appear to spend
more money litigating non-class, intra-business legal disputes than
they do litigating class actions; and (3) the largest settlements in class
actions, although enormous, are no larger than the largest settlements
and judgments in intra-business disputes.  If non-class, intra-business
suits cost corporations as much or more than class actions, it under-
mines claims by business amici about class actions’ devastating finan-
cial effects.
A. Businesses Sue Each Other Far More Often than Classes of
Plaintiffs Sue Businesses
Although class actions pervade popular commentary about the
costs of business litigation, class actions appear to represent a rela-
tively small portion of the lawsuits in which businesses are involved.
When Norton Rose Fulbright L.L.P., formerly Fulbright & Jaworski
L.L.P., surveyed its clients, it found that although class actions were
among businesses’ “top five [litigation] concerns,” class actions were
not actually among the businesses’ “five most active areas of litiga-
57. Id. at 830.
58. See Wal-Mart Sitting Pretty on top of Fortune 500 List, MARKETINGCHARTS (Apr. 25,
2008), http://www.marketingcharts.com/traditional/wal-mart-sitting-pretty-on-top-of-fortune-500
-list-4364/ (reporting revenues of $10.6 trillion for the Fortune 500 in 2007, an increase of 7.1%
over the 2006 fiscal year).
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tion.”59  Indeed, only 16% of the businesses in the survey had been
served with a class action in the prior year.60
State and federal dockets tell a similar story.  Class actions made up
less than .5% of case filings in the busiest California state courts be-
tween 2000–2005.61  Class actions also made up less than 1% of the
federal docket in 2000.62  Although federal class action filings in-
creased by 72% between 2001–2007, following passage of the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, the absolute numbers of federal filings
remained relatively low.63
Intra-business litigation makes up a far more significant portion of
state and federal dockets.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics surveyed
state court contract litigation in seventy-five of the largest counties in
the country in 1992 and found that 40% of those cases involved intra-
business disputes.64  In her study of federal court litigation, Professor
Gillian Hadfield found that in 2000, 22.3% of federal cases involved
an organization suing another organization.65  So, in any given year,
businesses likely have many more pending lawsuits brought by (or
against) other businesses than they have class actions.
59. FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., SECOND ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY FINDINGS
6 (2005), http://www.fulbright.com/mediaroom/files/fj0536-us-v13.pdf.
60. Id. at 25.  This is an average; some industries are more likely to be served with a class
action than others.  Fulbright & Jaworski reported that in 2005, 30% of manufacturing compa-
nies surveyed had one or more class actions filed against them, whereas 17% of the technology
and communications companies surveyed had one or more class actions filed against them. Id. at
26.  The likelihood that a company will be named a defendant in a class action also depends on
the value of the company.  Fulbright & Jaworski found that “[o]nly 5% of smaller companies
were targeted with class actions in the past year, [while] nearly 40% of companies with revenues
of $1 billion or more were served.” Id. at 27.
61. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, FINDINGS OF THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION, 2000–2006, at 4 (Mar. 2009), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/class-action-lit-
study.pdf.
62. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Dif-
ferences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil
Cases, 57 STAN L. REV. 1275, 1300 (2005) (“Class actions . . . are rare in federal court: In 2000,
among the nonprisoner, non-student loan cases, they account for fewer than one percent of all
cases.”).
63. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 43, at 3.  In their study of eighty-eight district courts, Lee R
and Willging found that 2,354 class actions were filed in or removed to federal courts from Janu-
ary through June 2007. Id.
64. Galanter, supra note 9, at 591 tbl.1 (citing CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF R
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS
IN LARGE COUNTIES 4 tbl.4 (1995)).
65. Hadfield, supra note 62, at 1298 tbl.2. R
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B. Businesses Appear To Spend More Money Litigating Intra-
Business Legal Disputes than They do
Litigating Class Actions
Just because there are more intra-business disputes than class ac-
tions does not mean that class actions cost businesses less.  Indeed,
one might expect—based on arguments by the Chamber of Com-
merce and other business amici—that the costs of defending against
class actions dwarf the expenses of all other cases in which businesses
are involved.  Available evidence suggests, however, that this is not
the case.
Businesses—particularly large businesses—appear to spend a great
deal on litigation.  In one survey, Fortune 500 companies reported that
they spend an astonishing one-third of their profits on litigation.66  In
another study, companies in the Fortune 200 reported spending an av-
erage of $115 million in legal fees and costs in 2008.67  Brian Fitzpat-
rick offered some sensible reasons why litigation might be so costly for
large corporations.
First, corporations are bigger today than they were in the past; they
span nations rather than just cities or states.  Thus it is more expen-
sive for corporate defendants to find and gather from their opera-
tions all information relevant to a piece of litigation. . . .
Second, changes in technology have permitted more people to
create, distribute, and store more documents than ever before. . . .
These technological advances have significantly increased the dis-
coverable material defendants possess.68
Fitzpatrick reasoned that responding to discovery requests could cost
millions of dollars because of these changes in the structure and func-
tion of corporations.  It could cost millions to collect documents, and
“[i]t is even more expensive to review the documents once they are
collected.”69
There is, however, no reason to conclude that class action litigation
is more expensive than other types of cases that businesses regularly
defend against.  There are many examples of exceedingly high litiga-
tion costs accrued during litigation between corporations.  For exam-
ple, the patent suit between Apple and Samsung has cost over one
66. John B. Henry, Fortune 500: The Total Cost of Litigation Estimated at One-Third Profits,
METRO. CORP. COUNS.: ELAWFORUM, Feb. 2008, at 28, 28, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/
pdf/2008/February/28.pdf.
67. See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPA-
NIES app. 1, at 7 fig.3 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/3448/downloadtoken=6Lz_MdxQ.
68. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621,
1638–39 (2012) (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 1640.
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billion dollars in legal fees.70  Even less extraordinary patent suits are
expensive; one study found that patent suits cost each side between
$500,000 and $3 million to litigate.71
Although discovery in class actions can also be expensive for de-
fendants, the limited available evidence suggests that at least some
types of class actions cost less to defend against than some types of
non-class, intra-business suits.  When the FJC surveyed attorneys of
record in federal civil cases, it found that intellectual property cases
cost, on average, 2.37 times more to litigate than consumer cases.72
Although this survey did not directly compare intellectual property
cases to consumer class actions, it did control for several variables,
including the amount of money at stake, the factual complexity of the
case, and the role of electronically stored information in discovery.73
Consistent with this finding, midsized companies surveyed by Ful-
bright & Jaworski reported that intellectual property cases were the
“most expensive on average” to litigate.74  Regulatory matters were
the most expensive on average for the largest companies.75  Class ac-
tions were not identified by any industry surveyed as the most expen-
sive to litigate.76
This data is, of course, quite limited, and more research would be
necessary to make any rigorous claim about the comparative costs of
class actions and non-class, intra-business litigation.  Yet the data that
is available suggest that very few class actions are filed each year as a
proportion of overall litigation, and litigation costs associated with at
least some non-class, intra-business disputes are larger than those as-
sociated with some class action cases.  These two observations taken
70. Kurt Eichenwald, The Great Smartphone War, VANITY FAIR (June 2014), http://www.vani
tyfair.com/news/business/2014/06/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent-war.
71. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Exam-
ination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 243
(2006) (citing Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant
Opposition 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9731, 2003), http://pa
pers.nber.org/papers/W9731.pdf).  Another study found that “[m]ean fees for cases that went
through trial were $1.04 million for patentee litigants and $2.46 million for alleged infringers.
For cases that were decided prior to trial, the mean fees were $950,000 for patentee litigants and
$570,000 for alleged infringers.”  James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent
Litigation, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 59, 80–81 (2012).
72. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS
IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 12–14 tbls. 1 & 2 (2010).  Many thanks to Joe Do-
herty for helping me interpret and understand the significance of the FJC’s findings.
73. See id.
74. FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., supra note 59, at 16. R
75. Id.
76. See id.
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together call into question the assertion that class actions impose
uniquely burdensome discovery costs for corporate defendants.
C. Settlements and Judgments in Both Class Actions and Non-
Class, Intra-Business Disputes Can Be Enormous
The Chamber of Commerce and business amici repeatedly assert
that enormous judgments in class actions can bankrupt even large
businesses.  To be sure, class action settlements can be quite large: the
largest securities class action settlements have been several billion dol-
lars apiece,77 and the average securities class action settlement is close
to $100 million.78  But other types of class actions result in much
smaller payouts: consumer class action settlements average $18.8 mil-
lion, employee benefits class action settlements average $13.9 million,
and labor and employment settlements average under $10 million.79
The median settlements for each of these types of class actions are far
smaller, suggesting that most settlements in each type of class action
are more modest.80
The focus on the costs of class action settlements also overlooks the
fact that settlements and judgments in non-class, intra-business dis-
putes can be huge.  The largest settlements—like those in class ac-
tions—have cost defendants billions of dollars.  In recent years, Bank
of America paid Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac $9.3 billion to settle
claims regarding faulty mortgage bonds;81 Visa and MasterCard paid
American Express over $3.9 billion to settle an antitrust suit;82 Teva
Pharmaceutical and Sun Pharmaceutical, two generic drug manufac-
turers, paid Pfizer and Takeda Pharmaceutical $2.15 billion in a case
alleging patent infringement;83 and Volkswagen agreed to purchase at
least $1 billion worth of General Motors (G.M.) auto parts and pay an
additional $100 million to settle claims alleging that Volkswagen stole
77. See Top Ten by Largest Settlement, STAN. L. SCH.: SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://securities.stanford.edu/top-ten.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
78. Fitzpatrick, supra note 56, at 828 tbl.6. R
79. Id.
80. See id. (reporting that during the 2006–2007 study period, the median settlement amount
was $8 million for securities class actions, $5.3 million for employee benefits class actions, $2.9
million for consumer class actions, and $1.8 million for labor and employment class actions).
81. Margaret Chadbourn & Aruna Viswanatha, Bank of America To Pay $9.3 Billion To Settle
Mortgage Bond Claims, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
bankofamerica-settlement-fhfa-idUSBREA2P23720140326.
82. Eric Dash, MasterCard Will Pay $1.8 Billion to American Express, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/business/26credit.html.
83. Peter Loftus, Pfizer, Takeda To Get $2.15 Billion Settlement, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj
.com/articles/SB10001424127887324188604578541080995659790 (last updated June 12, 2013, 2:40
PM).
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trade secrets from G.M.84  Countless other suits have required compa-
nies to pay each other tens and hundreds of millions of dollars.
Although available evidence does not allow me to compare the to-
tal judgments and settlements in class actions and non-class, intra-bus-
iness disputes, or to compare the costs incurred in both types of cases
by any company in particular, anecdotal evidence suggests that at least
some businesses may be crying wolf.  In its amicus brief in Wal-Mart,
Intel Corp. wrote that a grant of class certification “can transform an
ordinary lawsuit into ‘bet-the-company’ litigation, even for a company
of Intel’s size.”85  Yet the case that recently required Intel to “bet the
firm” was not a class action but, instead, a 2005 antitrust lawsuit
brought against Intel by another company, Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc. (AMD).  Intel reportedly spent $116 million to defend itself in
this case86 and paid AMD $1.25 billion to resolve the case.87  Intel was
also investigated and fined for its anticompetitive conduct by the Eu-
ropean Commission, South Korean regulators, the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission, and the New York Attorney General.88  In contrast, a
decades-long class action against Intel recently settled, resulting in
payments of $15 to each class member; although consumers are still
filing claims for proceeds of the class action, the maximum total
amount that Intel would be required to pay under the terms of the
settlement is just over $70 million.89  When the Chamber of Com-
merce and business amici seek procedural protections from class ac-
tions, they suggest that class action payouts dwarf all other types of
litigation exposure.  But the settlements and attorneys’ fees Intel re-
cently paid to resolve commercial disputes dwarf those it will pay to
resolve a decades-long class action.
84. Robyn Meredith, VW Agrees To Pay G.M. $100 Million in Espionage Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/10/business/vw-agrees-to-pay-gm-100-million-in-
espionage-suit.html.
85. Brief of Intel Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 28, at 1. R
86. Don Clark, Intel Sues an Insurer over Litigation Costs, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB1235362485937817 (last updated Feb. 2, 2009, 12:01 AM).
87. Steve Lohr & James Kanter, A.M.D.-Intel Settlement Won’t End Their Woes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/technology/companies/13chip.html.
88. Julia Angwin, A Timeline of Intel and AMD’s Legal Battles, WALL ST. J.: DIGITS BLOG
(Nov. 12, 2009, 10:40 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/11/12/a-timeline-of-intel-and-amds-
legal-battles/ (reporting that the European Commission and South Korean regulators fined Intel
$1.45 billion and $25 million, respectively, and that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the
New York Attorney General commenced an investigation and lawsuit, respectively, against
Intel).
89. See Kurt Orzeck, Intel To Pay Millions To Settle Pentium 4 False Ad Suit, LAW360 (July 17,
2014, 4:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/558423/intel-to-pay-millions-to-settle-pentium-4-
false-ad-suit (reporting an estimated class size of  “3.3 million to 4.7 million consumers,” which
would result in a potential total payout of $70.5 million).
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D. The Bottom Line on Class Action Costs
Class actions appear to be brought less frequently than non-class,
intra-business disputes and may cost less per case to litigate.  Al-
though the largest class action settlements can cost corporations bil-
lions of dollars, the largest non-class, intra-business settlements can be
just as costly.  The focus by business amici and the Court on the alleg-
edly debilitating costs of class actions ignores the significant costs and
burdens of non-class, intra-business disputes.
The fact that businesses likely spend more money on non-class, in-
tra-business disputes does not mean that businesses prefer being sued
by a class than a corporate rival.  I can think of several reasons why a
corporation, given the choice, might elect to be sued by another busi-
ness instead of by a class of consumers, employees, or shareholders.
For example, when a business is sued by another business, it can assert
counterclaims; if the business defendant prevails on those counter-
claims, it might even come out ahead.  In contrast, counterclaims are
rarely available in class actions.  As a result, a corporate defendant
sued by a class only stands to lose money; even if the class claim is
dismissed, the corporate defendant will still need to pay its attorneys’
fees and has no chance of recovering from the other side.  In addition,
when a business is sued by another business, the parties can subject
each other to expensive discovery; if the businesses are comparably
sized, these costs should impose equally distributed pressure to reach
a mutually agreeable settlement.  In contrast, class action defendants
generally have the lion’s share of relevant documents in their posses-
sion and, therefore, presumably bear the brunt of discovery costs.90
Plaintiffs and their attorneys tell a very different story about the
effects of class action asymmetries.  Although the class action bar has
become better funded in recent years, corporations generally have far
more money than the classes of plaintiffs that sue them.91  Defendants
generally possess the key documents that could prove plaintiffs’
claims, allowing them to “obscure key facts through voluminous pro-
90. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 643 (1989) (“Large
litigants have files—warehouses full of files.  The adversary can demand that they be searched, at
great cost; the adversary can notice the depositions of 20 corporate officers.”).  Of course, busi-
nesses can also depose and seek information from class members and representatives.
91. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Katherine Lehe, Uncovering Discovery, 12 SEDONA CONF. J.
1, 26 (2011) (describing plaintiffs’ attorneys who work together to fund larger cases and
“counteract attrition tactics”); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned
Interests: Political Parties and the Two Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752,
1780–82 (2013) (describing third-party financing).
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duction and aggressive use of privilege and work product doctrine
arguments.”92
My goal is not to investigate the different litigation dynamics in
non-class, intra-business disputes and class actions or to assess
whether class action litigation imposes harsher burdens on plaintiffs or
defendants.  Instead, I aim to question the validity of claims about the
debilitating costs of class actions made in an effort to restrict plaintiffs’
abilities to bring these types of suits.  The Chamber of Commerce de-
spairs of “potentially bankrupting class actions” that threaten to “bury
American businesses in abusive class-action lawsuits to the detriment
of consumers, the U.S. economy and the judicial system itself[,]”93 but
the absolute costs of class action litigation appear comparable to, or
smaller than, businesses’ other litigation-related costs.  One may be-
lieve that all litigation is too expensive.  But if class actions are no
more financially devastating to businesses than non-class, intra-busi-
ness disputes, there is no basis to single out class actions as particu-
larly deserving of limitation.
V. CASE MERITS AND ATTORNEY PRACTICES
The Chamber of Commerce has raised, and the Supreme Court has
endorsed, two additional, related critiques of class action litigation;
that class action claims are often meritless, and plaintiffs’ class action
attorneys bring these meritless claims not to benefit class members
but to line their own pockets.  There are, to be sure, examples of frivo-
lous class actions suits and unscrupulous plaintiffs’ class action attor-
neys.  Yet similar critiques could be made about all types of litigation,
including non-class, intra-business disputes.  Businesses sometimes
bring meritless suits against each other.  And, just as plaintiffs’ class
action attorneys have been criticized for focusing overmuch on lining
their own pockets, attorneys representing corporations have been crit-
icized for doing work and charging fees against their clients’ best
interests.
A. Claims in Both Class Actions and Non-Class, Intra-Business
Disputes Can Be Frivolous
There are many high profile examples of seemingly frivolous class
actions—take, for example, the suits brought against Subway for false
92. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1733
(2012).
93. Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 27, at 5. R
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advertising because their “footlong” sandwiches are actually ten or
eleven inches long,94 or the suit brought against Sears because the all
“stainless steel” drum advertised in one of its clothes dryers contained
a small amount of ceramic around the rim.95  It is these types of
suits—when judges certify them as class actions—that presumably
force defendants to accept blackmail settlements.
Yet corporations have also been known to file questionable cases
against their brethren.  Caterpillar Inc. sued the Walt Disney Com-
pany to block the direct-to-DVD release of George of the Jungle 2,
which, according to Caterpillar, damaged the company’s reputation
with children by making its Wheel Loaders part of “an ‘evil attacking
army’ of industrialists seeking to destroy the jungle.”96  Johnson &
Johnson sued the American Red Cross, demanding that the Red Cross
remove its logo on items sold to the public, turn over products with
the Red Cross logo to Johnson & Johnson for destruction, and pay
punitive damages.97  Intel, a company that filed an amicus brief in
Wal-Mart, has been criticized for going into “hyperdrive on trademark
enforcement[,]” filing fifteen trademark infringement lawsuits in 2008,
including one against an electrician’s one-man business and another
against a two-person travel agency.98
It is impossible to know how often businesses bring frivolous claims
against each other—in no small part because a case’s merits are, at
least partially, in the eye of the beholder.  But even a cursory review
of non-class, intra-business disputes suggests that the class action bar
does not have a monopoly on questionable cases.  As noted by the
American Association for Justice, corporations that support the
Chamber of Commerce contend that “businesses are hindered by too
94. Jacob Gershman, Disgruntled Plaintiffs to Subway: ‘Show Me the Dough,’ WALL ST. J.: L.
BLOG (Jan. 25, 2013, 6:48 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/laws/2013/01/25/disgruntled-plaintiffs-to-sub
way-show-me-the-dough/.
95. Kurt Orzeck, Calif. Consumers Denied Class Cert. in Sears Dryers Suit, LAW360 (Feb. 13,
2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/509849/calif-consumers-denied-class-cert-in-
sears-dryers-suit.
96. Caterpillar Sues over ‘George 2,’ L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/
2003/oct/16/news/wk-e10filler16.
97. David Crary, Johnson & Johnson Sues Red Cross over Trademark, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/08/AR2007080802244
.html.
98. See Zusha Elinson, Intel Goes into Hyperdrive on Trademark Enforcement, RECORDER
(Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202425860526/Intel-Goes-Into-Hyperdrive-on-
Trademark-Enforcement?slreturn=20160202141115.
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many lawsuits,” but that “these same corporations show no hesitation
in liberally using the courthouse themselves.”99
B. Both Plaintiffs’ Class Action Attorneys and Attorneys
Representing Corporations Can Be Overcompensated
Criticisms of class action litigation often focus on the plaintiffs’ at-
torneys who bring these cases. According to the Chamber of Com-
merce and other business amici, plaintiffs’ class action attorneys seek
to recover astronomical attorneys’ fees on cases of questionable merit
for which the class members receive little or no benefit.100
There are, certainly, anecdotes consistent with this portrayal of the
class action plaintiffs’ bar.  Yet it—like the other depictions of class
action litigation offered by business amici and accepted by the
Court—appears to be overblown.  Brian Fitzpatrick examined awards
for plaintiffs’ attorneys in federal court class action cases and found
that plaintiffs’ attorneys recovered approximately $2.5 billion each
year in fees.101  Although this may sound like a lot of money, the clas-
ses of plaintiffs in these cases recovered approximately $16 billion per
year.102  Fitzpatrick concluded that “in the aggregate, class action law-
yers appear to be taking only 15% of all of the money they recover for
class members in federal court”; a percentage “much lower than the
typical take of contingency-fee lawyers in individual litigation.”103
When Fitzpatrick examined awards in individual class action cases, he
found that the mean and median payments for attorneys were around
25% of the total recovery, an amount also lower than most contin-
gency fee arrangements would allow.104  Moreover, in contrast to
other types of litigation, the terms of class action settlement agree-
ments—including the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ compensation—are re-
viewed for fairness by the courts.  When attorneys’ fees in class
actions are excessive, courts can, and do, refuse to approve
settlements.105
99. AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I SUE: EXPOSING THE LAWSUIT-HAPPY
HYPOCRITES OF U.S. CHAMBER’S INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM 3 (2011), https://www.justice
.org/sites/default/files/file-uploads/Do_As_I_Say_Not_As_I_Sue_2011.pdf.
100. See supra notes 23–24, 28, 35, and accompanying text. R
101. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2043, 2045 (2010).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2045–46.
105. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Appeals Court Rejects $1 Million Fee in Radio Shack Coupon
Settlement, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2014, 4:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/09/
19/posner-rejects-1-million-fee-in-radio-shack-coupon-settlement/#24618872le07; see also Lynn
A. Baker et al., Is the Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in Securities Class Actions,
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Criticisms of the incentives and practices of the plaintiffs’ class ac-
tion bar also overlook similar criticisms that have been made of the
incentives and practices of attorneys at large law firms.  Most firms
charge their corporate clients by the hour, a system that has been
found to be less cost-effective for clients than the contingency fee
model generally used by plaintiffs’ class action attorneys.  In attempt-
ing to parse out the causes of high litigation costs, an FJC study found
that plaintiffs’ attorneys who charge their clients by the hour “re-
ported costs almost 25% higher than those using other billing methods
(primarily contingency fee).”106  This makes sense: attorneys relying
on contingency fees have strong incentives to win (so that they re-
cover fees) while spending the least amount of time litigating the case
(so that they recover the most possible per hour worked).  In contrast,
attorneys working by the hour will be paid for their work regardless of
whether their client wins, and they will be paid more money for more
hours worked regardless of whether those additional hours were nec-
essary to prevail.
Large law firms have the resources (from their clients) to engage in
“meticulous and exhaustive research, painstaking assembly of data,
and generous use of experts.”107  Although these resources give law-
yers representing corporations the “latitude to give their technical
best to the problems they work on[,]”108 they also create opportunities
for attorneys to perform unnecessary work to drive up their fees.  Al-
most 2,000 years ago, Roman poet Marcus Valerius Martialis com-
plained of the tendency of “expensive lawyers” to do more than is
necessary:
There is no poison here, no rape or force—
a simple case: my neighbor stole my goats.
But my expensive lawyer will discourse
on the whole history of law.  He quotes
book, precedent and chapter ‘til he’s hoarse.
Fine, noble words! But what about my goats?109
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1401 (2015) (finding reductions in 15% of securities class action attor-
ney fee applications). C.f. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Ex-
penses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 250 (2010)
(finding that courts granted the requested attorneys’ fees in more than 70% of cases).
106. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 72, at 6. R
107. Marc Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United States, in
THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS 152, 157 (Robert
Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983).
108. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 152 (1978).
109. Eugene Volokh, “But What About My Goats?”: The Roman Poet Martial on Lawyers,
WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/
20/what-about-my-goats-the-roman-poet-martial-on-lawyers/ (quoting ROGER DICKINSON-
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In a recent case involving a fee dispute between a large law firm, DLA
Piper, and one of its clients, discovery revealed that attorneys were
intentionally inflating their fees.  As one attorney wrote in an e-mail
to a colleague: “Now [a lawyer at the firm] has random people work-
ing full time on random research projects in standard churn that bill,
baby! mode . . . .  That bill shall know no limits.”110
Although the e-mails uncovered in the DLA Piper litigation may
seem extraordinary, many attorneys who charge by the hour have told
researchers that they regularly overbill their clients.  In a 1995 survey,
Professor William Ross polled hundreds of attorneys and found that
“more than one-third of outside counsel admitted that the prospect of
billing additional hours has at least sometimes influenced their deci-
sions to proceed with work that they otherwise would not have per-
formed.”111  When Professor Ross asked similar questions in a 2007
survey, he found that 54.6% of respondents “had sometimes per-
formed unnecessary tasks just to bump up their billable output.”112
Over one-third of the attorneys Ross surveyed in 2007 also admitted
that they had double billed—charged two clients for the same time.113
The structure of law firms that represent corporations may en-
courage billing clients for unnecessary work and double billing. The
Chamber of Commerce chides the class action plaintiffs’ bar for creat-
ing disputes that would otherwise not have been brought, only to cash
in on the legal fees associated with those cases.  Yet scholars have told
a version of this same story about the rise of the large law firm.
Before the 1960s, businesses rarely resorted to the courts when they
had disputes. During the 1970s, law firms were increasingly willing “to
provide managers with opinion letters or other advice that nonper-
formance of a contract followed by litigation was a legally appropriate
course.”114  This advice led to increased lawsuits, which, in turn, led to
increased work (and profits) for firms.
Beginning in the 1970s, law firms dramatically grew their litigation
practices to accommodate the rise in contract litigation and then be-
BROWN, CATULLUS & MARTIAL TRANSLATIONS & IMITATIONS 50 (Roger Dickinson-Brown
trans., 2d ed. 2012)).
110. Peter Lattman, Suit Offers a Peek at the Practice of Inflating a Legal Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/suit-offers-a-peek-at-the-practice-of-pad
ding-a-legal-bill/ (quoting Christopher Thomson, former attorney at DLA Piper).
111. William G. Ross, The Ethics of Time Based Billing by Attorneys, 1998 PROF. LAW. 81, 82.
112. Nathan Koppel, Study Suggests Significant Billing Abuse, WALL. ST.: J. L. BLOG (May 1,
2007, 9:04 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/01/study-suggests-significant-billing-abuse/.
113. Id.
114. William E. Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite Bar in New York City, 1960-1980, 39
EMORY L.J. 413, 436 (1990).
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gan competing with other large firms for clients.115 Firms had to be
prepared to pursue litigation or risk losing their clients.  Professor
William Nelson explained this shift as follows:
In the 1960s, the following three things were true: clients loyally
gave all their legal work to a single firm; firms lacked substantial
litigating capacity; and litigation was thought to be an inappropriate
way of settling business disputes.  Thus, it was easy for a lawyer to
advise a client that litigation was not a viable option.  A decade
later, however, with a large litigation department at hand and cli-
ents prepared to take their cases to another firm, the lawyer faced a
different reality: litigation was an available option.  The lawyer had
to advise the client of this fact, and, if he or she did not want to lose
the client to another law firm, the lawyer would also have to inform
the client that the firm’s litigation department could effectively liti-
gate the dispute.116
Attorneys had incentives not only to advise clients of the possibility of
litigation but also to encourage their clients to pursue that course.
“Once the litigation departments had been built up, they had to be
used if they were to remain in existence.”117
Steep annual billing requirements may also pressure attorneys to
perform unnecessary legal work, overbill, and double bill.118  As Jus-
tice Rehnquist once observed, an associate expected to bill more than
two thousand hours per year may “favor exhaustive and exhausting
research over exercising the judgment necessary to decide whether ten
more hours of research will really benefit a client,” and she may also
be tempted “to exaggerate the hours actually put in.”119
Corporations accuse plaintiffs’ class action attorneys of imposing
devastating costs on businesses without acknowledging the high and
sometimes unnecessary costs imposed on corporations by their own
attorneys.  Moreover, large law firms applaud themselves for the kind
of aggressive tactics they criticize when taken by the plaintiffs’ class
action bar.  Skadden Arps authored the Chamber of Commerce’s ami-
cus brief in Wal-Mart, which contended that liberal class certification
standards would encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring frivolous
115. Id. at 457.
116. Id. at 458.
117. Id. at 457–58.
118. See Nicki Kuckes, The Hours: The Short, Unhappy History of How Lawyers Bill Their
Clients, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2002, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-
2002/review_kuckes_sepoct2002.msp; Adam Liptak, On the Job: Stop the Clock? Critics Call the
Billable Hour a Legal Fiction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/29/
jobs/on-the-job-stop-the-clock-critics-call-the-billable-hour-a-legal-fiction.html?pagewanted=all;
and Douglas R. Richmond, The New Law Firm Economy, Billable Hours, and Professional Re-
sponsibility, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207 (2000), for discussions of these concerns.
119. William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 153, 155 (1987).
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cases that hobble businesses and society at large.120  Yet, on its web-
site, Skadden Arps congratulates itself on its “[rising] to prominence
in the ’60s and ’70s by taking on the proxy fights and hostile tender
offers that white-shoe law firms deemed ‘ungentlemanly.’”121
The Chamber of Commerce and business amici portray class actions
as often meritless and filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys only seeking to line
their own pockets.  There is, however, no evidence that class action
claims and plaintiffs’ class action attorneys are especially blamewor-
thy.  And there is evidence that some non-class, intra-business dis-
putes and law firms representing corporations share these flaws.
VI. THE COSTS OF NOT SUING BUSINESS
Business amici and the Supreme Court have not only miscalculated
the costs of suing business—they have also ignored the costs of raising
procedural barriers to plaintiffs’ suits.  Concerns about the extreme
costs of class actions have led to the creation of a series of procedural
gateways that make it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring their claims
or prevail on the claims they do bring.  Without the ability to aggre-
gate claims, plaintiffs with small damages may never sue.  With height-
ened pleading requirements, plaintiffs with claims that cannot be
plausibly pled may not be able to find a lawyer willing to represent
them or may have their cases dismissed.
Although the Chamber of Commerce argued for these heightened
procedural gateways to protect defendants against meritless claims,
the Court’s pleading requirements, class certification requirements,
and arbitration restrictions may impact plaintiffs’ abilities to bring
meritorious claims as well.  It makes intuitive sense that a plaintiff
may have a valid claim but may nevertheless have her case dismissed
because she does not have the facts necessary, prediscovery, to draft a
plausible complaint.  Thus far, there is no conclusive evidence that the
plausibility pleading standard only filters out meritless cases.122
120. See Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 27, at 3. Because Skadden penned these words on behalf of a client, it is perhaps R
unfair to attribute the sentiment to attorneys at the firm.  On the other hand, the firm’s attorneys
most likely made—or were at least directly involved in—decisions about what arguments to
raise and how to frame those arguments.
121. The Firm, SKADDEN, http://www.skadden.com/the-firm (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).  Note
that lawsuits played a critical role in the proxy fights and hostile tender offers described by
Skadden on their website; they served as “a way for companies or their management to show
backbone and to maintain the support of investors, to extend time for negotiation or to develop
options, and to accomplish other ends.” LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND
THE RISE OF A LEGAL EMPIRE 140 (1993).
122. After examining nearly 2,000 cases, Professor Jonah Gelbach was unable “to clearly de-
termine the quality-filtering effects of [Twombly and Iqbal].”  Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts
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Strict class certification standards and limitations on aggregate arbi-
tration may also prevent potential plaintiffs from filing meritorious
cases.  As Justice Breyer observed in his dissent in Concepcion, re-
strictions on aggregation “can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon
their claims rather than to litigate.”123  Lawyers are highly unlikely to
represent plaintiffs who only have small amounts at stake:
What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Con-
cepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a
$30.22 claim?  (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17
million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or
a fanatic sues for $30”).124
Consistent with this observation, Professor Judith Resnik found that,
on average, just twenty-seven of AT&T’s millions of customers file
claims for arbitration each year.125
Plaintiffs whose claims are dismissed are most directly affected by
heightened procedural gateways, but there are also social costs associ-
ated with these procedural barriers unaccounted for by the Court.
Lawsuits have unearthed critical information about corporate harms
to the public, politicians, and regulators.126  As Professor Wendy Wag-
ner explained:
in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 369, 424 (2016).  In another study,
Professor Alexander Reinert examined a group of complaints filed before Twombly and Iqbal,
identified approximately 100 that he believed would have been dismissed for not satisfying the
plausibility standard, and found that more than one-half had resulted in a settlement or plain-
tiff’s verdict.  Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 127
(2011).  Reinert’s study focused on cases filed pre-Twombly and Iqbal, so it did not measure the
actual impact of the plausibility standard, and the settlements Reinert identified could, arguably,
have been of the “blackmail” variety—forced to avoid the costs of discovery. See Gelbach,
supra note 122, at 373 n.7.  Yet Reinert’s findings offer some reason to believe that Twombly and R
Iqbal may well screen out winning cases.
123. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc.,
376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)).
125. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private
in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2812 (2015) (citing Consumer Arbitra-
tion Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2015) (examining individual filing rates for the years
2009–2014)).  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has also found extremely low rates of
arbitration filings concerning credit card, checking account, and payday loan disputes. CON-
SUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS 13 n.25 (2013)
(finding that between 2010–2012, there was an annual average of “235 consumer-filed credit card
disputes, 20 consumer-filed checking account disputes, and 44 consumer-filed payday loan dis-
putes” in which consumers filed for arbitration and noting that “[n]early all the arbitration
clauses studied include provisions stating that arbitration may not proceed on a class basis”).
126. See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation To Enhance Regulatory Policy Mak-
ing: Evaluating Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-
Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1843–58 (2008) (describing the information re-
vealed in gun litigation and clergy sexual abuse litigation); Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails:
Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 714–27 (2007) (showing
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Today we have a much better understanding of the risks of asbestos,
tobacco, ultra-absorbent tampons, and the Dalkon Shield, thanks to
tort litigation brought against these companies.  In each of these
cases, the manufacturers resisted disclosing internal, damaging in-
formation that was critically important to assessing the safety of
their products or activities.  It was only as a result of litigation that
the extent of their internal knowledge about product risks was un-
covered and publicly exposed, revelations that often led to greater
regulatory oversight and public condemnation.127
During discovery in lawsuits against the makers of Ephedra, Prozac,
and Vioxx, plaintiffs uncovered information about the harms of the
pills that defendants knew of and failed to disclose.128  Discovery in
the environmental contamination lawsuit against DuPont, depicted in
the movie A Civil Action, revealed that DuPont had long known of
the hazards of chemicals used in making Teflon but failed to report
those hazards to regulators.129  In recent years, several products liabil-
ity suits and toxic tort cases, among others, have been dismissed for
failing to comply with Iqbal, Twombly, or Wal-Mart.130  What infor-
mation would have come to light had these cases been allowed to pro-
ceed to discovery?
Litigation also sometimes reveals information previously unknown
to the very defendants named in the suit.131  Since the early 2000s, 124
people have died and 275 more have been injured as a result of a
how gun litigation and breast implant litigation have unearthed previously unknown information
and thereby supplemented regulatory efforts).
127. Wagner, supra note 126, at 711 (footnotes omitted). R
128. Id. at 711–12.
129. See id. at 712–13.
130. See Kevin T. Haroff, Open or Shut?—Pleading Federal Environmental Claims After
Twombly and Iqbal, ENVTL. LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMM. NEWSL., July 2012, at 3, 3, http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/eltt/201207_eltt.authcheckdam.
pdf (assessing the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on environmental litigation and toxic torts);
Douglas A. Henderson et al., Environmental Class Actions After Dukes: Is ‘Rigorous’ Analysis
the New Rule of Law?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.bna.com/environmental-
class-actions-after-dukes-is-rigorous-analysis-the-new-rule-of-law/ (examining class certification
in environmental actions after Wal-Mart); Erick Lasker & Michael Junk, Holding Pharma Plain-
tiffs to Their Pleading Burden: Implications of Twombly and Iqbal, 11 ENGAGE 113, 114–17
(2010), http://www.hollingsworthllp.com/uploads/23/doc/media.384.pdf (assessing the impact of
Twombly and Iqbal on pharmaceutical cases); Mark Raffman & Andrew Hudson, Dukes Pro-
vides New Tools To Fight Class Certification in Building Products Cases, 41 PROD. SAFETY &
LIAB. REP. (BNA), No. 277, at 1, (Mar. 4, 2013) http://www.goodwinprocter.com/~/media/
474A0C2C1F364493B3C0D0F0FCB28534.pdf (examining how the holding in Wal-Mart can be
used to defeat class certification in products liability cases); see also, e.g., Timmons v. Linvatec
Corp., 263 F.R.D. 582, 585–86 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss be-
cause the plaintiffs could not identify which pharmaceutical defendant was responsible for the
drug at issue).
131. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1055, 1056–57 (2015).
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defect in a G.M. ignition switch that caused its cars to power off and
their airbags not to deploy when involved in a crash.132  G.M. and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Commission investigated but could
not determine the cause for the stalls.133  It was only during the litiga-
tion of a case, brought by the family of a woman named Brooke Mel-
ton who died in a Chevrolet Cobalt, that the truth came to light.134
When the plaintiffs’ expert disassembled the ignition switch in Mel-
ton’s car and compared it to that in a later-model Cobalt, he discov-
ered that the design of the switch had been surreptitiously changed to
make it more difficult to disable.135  This discovery “set in motion
G.M.’s worldwide recall of 2.6 million Cobalts and other cars, and one
of the gravest safety crises in the company’s history.”136
Barriers to suit can prevent this type of critical information from
being uncovered.  Years before Brooke Melton died, two other young
women, Natasha Weigel and Amy Rademaker, died in Wisconsin
when the ignition switch shut off in Weigel’s Chevrolet Cobalt.137
Neither woman’s parents could find lawyers to take their cases, which
was apparently because Wisconsin has a $350,000 damages cap and it
would have been exceedingly expensive to litigate their cases against
G.M.138  Melton’s case was brought five years later in Georgia, a state
without a damages cap.139  We do not know how many people died or
were injured in accidents tied to the ignition defect in the years be-
tween 2005 (when Weigel and Rademaker were killed) and 2012
(when Melton’s parents’ expert discovered the surreptitious design
switch).140  But, perhaps, as Weigel’s stepfather recently observed,
132. Kirsten Korosec, Ten Times More Deaths Linked to Faulty Switch than GM First Re-
ported, FORTUNE (Aug. 24, 2015, 5:38 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/24/feinberg-gm-faulty-igni
tion-switch/; see also Barry Meier & Hilary Stout, Victims of G.M. Deadly Defect Fall Through
Legal Cracks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30//of-gm-deadly-de-
fect-fall-through-legal-cracks.html?_r=0.
133. ANTON R. VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COM-
PANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 12 (May 29, 2014) (describing the investigation of
G.M.’s ignition switch defect by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
134. Bill Vlasic, An Engineer’s Eureka Moment with a G.M. Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/business-florida-engineer-unlocked-the-mystery-of-gms-igni-
tion-flaw.html.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Meier & Stout, supra note 132. R
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See Vlasic, supra note 134.  Although I have found no timeline indicating the deaths of R
people in cars connected to the ignition defect, press reports reflect three deaths between
2005–2012. See Danielle Ivory, G.M.’s Ignition Problem: Who Knew What When, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/05/18/business/gms-ignition-problem-who-knew-what-
when.html (last updated Sept. 15, 2014) (describing a crash in 2006 that killed Hasaya Chan-
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they “could have saved lives” had they been able to find a lawyer to
take their case.141
The Chamber of Commerce and other business amici have argued
that class actions harm society because they “have the unfortunate
effects of ‘jeopardizing jobs and driving up prices for consumers’” and
will “often force companies to scale back operations or discontinue
certain products or services.”142  But neither the Chamber of Com-
merce nor the Supreme Court considers the costs of restricting access
to the courts.  At this time, it is impossible to calculate the costs of
these procedural restrictions on plaintiffs who would have—but did
not—sue, or the costs to society of failing to expose wrongdoing.  The
difficulty of measuring these effects is not, however, a reason to pre-
tend that they do not exist.  The Court’s failure to account for the
effects of heightened gateways on plaintiffs’ claims prevents it from
truly understanding the costs and benefits of the procedural restric-
tions it imposes.
VII. RECALIBRATION
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Twombly, Wal-Mart, Com-
cast, and Concepcion appear to rely on arguments that overstate the
likelihood of blackmail settlements and the costs of class actions to
businesses, and ignore the costs of limiting redress not only for plain-
tiffs but also for defendants and society at large.  In this Part, I offer a
few suggestions for modifying civil procedure doctrine that could be
summed up with an old carpentry proverb: “Measure twice, cut once.”
The Court should not heed advocates’ and amici’s assertions about the
effects of class actions and other procedural features when no empiri-
cal evidence is available to support those assertions.  Instead, the
Court should defer the assessment of claims about the costs and bur-
dens of class actions to other entities—including Congress and the Ju-
dicial Conference—that are better situated to examine the effects of
procedural rules on litigants and modify the rules accordingly.143  And
suthus); Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., 13 Deaths, Untold Heartache, from G.M. Defect, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/business/13-deaths-untold-heartache-from-
gm-defect.html (describing a crash that killed Esther Matthews and Grace Elliot).  Given the
finding that 124 people have died as a result of the defective ignition switch, it is highly likely
that more than three people died during this seven-year period. See generally Korosec, supra
note 132.
141. Meier & Stout, supra note 132 (quoting Ken Rimer, Natasha Weigel’s stepfather). R
142. Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 27, at 22 (quoting William Branigin, Congress Changes Class Action Rules, WASH. R
POST, Feb. 17, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32674-2005Feb17.html).
143. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1705–06.  This does not mean that the Judicial Conference R
rulemaking procedures are immune from these same critiques. The 2015 amendments to the
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as long as critical facts are not available—as long as the effects of
procedural rules are impossible to “measure”—there should be more
hesitation to “cut” and a greater inclination toward procedural adjust-
ments that do not so dramatically impair the ability of plaintiffs to file
suits.144
Prescriptions for reform in law review articles are often so far
fetched as to be fairy tales.  Yet, in this instance, it appears that the
Supreme Court has recently adopted each of these approaches.  In
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,145 Halliburton and amici
argued that the Court should create procedural rules that restrict se-
curities class actions for reasons that should sound familiar; because
these actions “allow plaintiffs to extort large settlements from defend-
ants for meritless claims; punish innocent shareholders, who end up
having to pay settlements and judgments; impose excessive costs on
businesses; and consume a disproportionately large share of judicial
resources.”146  Yet in Halliburton, unlike the other decisions discussed
supra, Chief Justice Roberts refused to rely on these arguments, con-
cluding, instead, that “[t]hese concerns are more appropriately ad-
dressed to Congress.”147
The Supreme Court has also recently used nondispositive measures
to address ill incentives in litigation.  In his dissent in Twombly, Jus-
tice Stevens complained that the majority raised pleading standards
instead of using less restrictive measures—including discovery man-
agement and sanctions—to prevent the harms it was intending to ad-
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been criticized for being unsupported by available evi-
dence and “benefit[ting] large corporate litigants and disadvantag[ing] individual plaintiffs, clas-
ses of plaintiffs and groups suing to enforce their civil rights.”  Henry J. Kelston, FRCP
Discovery Amendments Prove Highly Controversial, LAW360 (Feb. 27, 2014, 5:06 PM), http://
www.law360.com/articles/512821/frep-discovery-amendments-prove-highly-controversial.  After
reviewing extensive written comments and holding public hearings, the Rules Committee
amended some of its proposed modifications. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 14 (Sept. 2014), http://www
.uscourts.gov/file/14523/download-2014.pdf.  See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal
Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559 (2015),
for further discussion of the political dynamics in rulemaking.  Despite the limitations of the
rulemaking process, it still purports to collect and assess data regarding the effects of the Rules
on litigant behavior.  Courts are not well suited to engage in this type of information gathering,
commentary, assessment, and modification.
144. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1697–1708, for these same arguments articulated in more R
detail.
145. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
146. Id. at 2413 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 39–45, Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (No. 13-
317), 2013 WL 6907610).
147. Id.
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dress.148  Stevens’s dissent did not, of course, win the day.  But, in
another context, the Court has recognized the power of pathway tools
to curb frivolous suits.  In two recent patent cases, Highmark Inc. v.
Allcare Health Management System, Inc.149 and Octane Fitness, LLC
v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,150 the Court made it easier for prevail-
ing defendants to recover attorneys’ fees from the plaintiffs who sue
them.  These decisions are understood to provide “an additional tool
for alleged infringers to fight back against plaintiffs who assert and
maintain meritless claims of patent infringement in hopes of a quick
payoff.”151  Instead of preventing cases from proceeding past plead-
ing, class certification, and other procedural gateways, the Court
should more heavily rely on these types of nondispositive pathway ap-
proaches to address litigation’s pathologies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have shown that several of the Supreme Court’s
recent decisions limiting plaintiffs’ procedural rights are grounded in
empirically unsupported assertions about the debilitating costs and
burdens of class actions to businesses and society.  The ills I have de-
scribed are not, however, limited to the cases discussed in this Article.
Courts are not the only entities that appear to protect the interests
of businesses over individuals.  As Gillian Hadfield has noted, after
the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress almost immediately set
out to limit individual plaintiffs’ personal injury claims, yet it made no
parallel effort to anticipate or address the costs of resulting commer-
cial litigation: “megalawsuits over insurance policies, business inter-
ruption claims, property damage claims, force majeure clauses, airline
bankruptcies, and so on.”152
And Twombly, Wal-Mart, Comcast, and Concepcion are not the
only cases in which the Court has assumed the world works in ways
that are unsupported by evidence.  For example, as I have shown pre-
viously, several Supreme Court doctrines rely on the assumption that
law enforcement officers are personally responsible for paying settle-
148. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593 n.13 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“The potential for ‘sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming’ discovery is no reason to
throw the baby out with the bathwater.  The Court vastly underestimates a district court’s case-
management arsenal.” (citation omitted)).
149. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
150. 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
151. Bijal Vakiletal, Supreme Court Issues Two “High Octane” Decisions To Address Abusive
Patent Litigation, WHITE & CASE (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/
supreme-court-issues-two-high-octane-decisions-address-abusive-patent#.
152. Hadfield, supra note 62, at 1291. R
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ments and judgments awarded against them when nothing could be
further from the truth.153  The Justices have selective blindness in this
area; they have, on more than one instance, rejected an argument be-
cause it was unsupported by evidence and adopted a contrasting view
in the same opinion that was equally without empirical support.154
In these areas, and many others as well, a greater inclination to
measure—and a greater hesitancy to cut—would be well advised.
153. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014) (describ-
ing the evidence about near certain and universal indemnification of police officers that under-
mines the assumptions underlying the qualified immunity, municipal liability, and punitive
damages doctrines).
154. Take, for example, the majority decision in Evans v. Jeff D., in which the Court held that
defendants could offer settlements in Section 1983 cases conditioned on plaintiffs waiving their
entitlement to attorneys’ fees.  475 U.S. 717, 743 (1986).  The Court reasoned that “a general
proscription against negotiated waiver of attorney’s fees in exchange for a settlement on the
merits would itself impede vindication of civil rights, at least in some cases, by reducing the
attractiveness of settlement[,]” but it offered no empirical support for this assertion. Id. at 732.
Yet the majority rejected as “premature” “the possibility that decisions by individual clients to
bargain away fee awards may, in the aggregate and in the long run, diminish lawyers’ expecta-
tions of statutory fees in civil rights cases[,]” which might, in turn, shrink “the pool of lawyers
willing to represent plaintiffs in such cases” because there was no “reason or documentation to
support such a concern at the present time.” Id. at 741 n.34.
